



Tock: A Safe and Secure Operating System for Root-of-Trust Hardware

Zero Trust Hardware Architectures Workshop (ZTHA) September 4, 2024 Brad Campbell – bradjc@virginia.edu http://www.cs.virginia.edu/~bjc8c/





Chromebook





Tock: embedded operating system

- Key design goals
 - 1. Safety
 - 2. Security
 - 3. Multiprogrammability
- Targets microcontrollers
 - Ex: Cortex-M, RISC-V 32 bit
 - 16-256kB RAM, 256kB-1MB code
 - No virtual memory

Industry buy-in

- Google <u>OpenTitan</u>, <u>OpenSK</u>
- Microsoft
- HPE
- Infineon
- OxidOS Automotive




Overview

- Tock Operating System
 - What is it?
 - Tock Threat Model
 - Dynamic Memory Allocation
 - Processes and Updates
- Features in-the-works
 - Emerging use cases
- Community






OpenSK 3D printed case



Tock OS architecture



- Tock: new OS for IoT emphasizing safety and reliability
 - Written in the Rust programming language (emphasizes safety and robustness)
- · Individual processes are "sandboxed"
 - Cannot access or affect any other process
 - If a process is buggy or malicious it does not compromise the entire system




Kernel written entirely in Rust



- Rust: type- and memory-safe systems language
 - Types enforced by compiler: no buffer overflows, null dereferences, or arbitrary memory accesses
 - Fast: statically compiled, within 30% performance with C
 - No garbage collection, all memory lifetimes tracked
- ...but low-level OS code is fundamentally memory-unsafe
 - Memory-mapped I/O
 - Interrupts
 - Context switches
 - System calls
- Rust provides the unsafe keyword as an escape hatch
 - Disables certain (not all) compiler checks
 - Additional language features allowed (e.g. dereferencing pointers)
 - Tock very explicit about where unsafe is used


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Support for 30+ boards










Architectural trust layers



- Applications
 - Completely untrusted
 - Isolated using MPU
- Capsules
 - Untrusted
 - In Rust, no unsafe
- Core Kernel & Drivers
 - Trusted
 - Limited unsafe



Tock Threat Model




- Formal Definition of what the kernel guarantees
- Isolation Provided to Processes
 - **Confidentiality**: A process' data may not be accessed by other processes or by capsules, unless explicitly permitted by the process.
 - **Integrity**: Process data may not be modified by other processes or by capsules, except when allowed by the process.
 - Availability: Processes may not deny service to each other at runtime.
- Isolation Provided to Kernel Code
 - **Confidentiality**: Kernel data may not be accessed by processes or capsules, except where explicitly permitted by the owning component.
 - **Integrity**: Processes and capsules may not modify kernel data except through APIs intentionally exposed by the owning code.
 - **Availability**: Processes cannot starve the kernel of resources or otherwise perform denial-of-service attacks against the kernel.
- · Implementing these guarantees
 - Rust compiler
 - Hardware memory protection
 - Application format
 - · Software capabilities
 - · Code review and software architecture
- More detail: https://book.tockos.org/doc/threat_model/threat_model

Challenge: ensuring reliability with limited resources




- Dynamic applications can lead to resource exhaustion in the kernel
- What happens when malloc() fails inside the kernel?!?
 - Crash??



Dynamic allocation in the kernel is OK for a while...






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
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A broken/buggy/malicious app exhausts the kernel's heap!






Fix: all allocation is done in "Grant" regions inside of process memory space




If a process exhausts its Grant region, only that process will fail/crash






Process format and credentials in TockOS





- TBF Header
- Process Binary
 - Actual instructions and data for the process (compiled from any language)
- TBF Footer
 - · List of credentials for the process
 - Ex: hash, HMAC, signature




Processes can be updated individually



Processes stored sequentially in flash:

	Tock Process			Tock Process			Tock Process		
FLASH	TBF Header	Process Executable Binary	TBF Footer	TBF Header	Process Executable Binary	TBF Footer	TBF Header	Process Executable Binary	TBF Footer

Core kernel workflow:



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Panic-free code: Converting runtime checks to compile-time checks



• Simple example: what happens if:

uint8_t buffer[10]; x = buffer[15];

- •C: memory bug
- Rust: system panic
- Crowdstrike failure shows the downsides of kernel panics!

Let the compiler reason about where crashes can happen




- Unrecoverable errors become abort()
- At compile time, verify the compiler did not insert any panic() calls
 - Parse the generated ELF or LLVM IR
 - Fail if panic() is present
 - Panic is how rust signals a runtime error
 - · Better than a security vulnerability
 - · Still results in a security crash
- Use alternatives to avoid panic() calls
 - Eg: replace buffer[15] with buffer.get(15).unwrap_or(0)

Growing Community around Tock

- Tock World 7 Meeting June 26-28, 2024
 - Meeting of users from academia and industry
 - Held at UCSD
 - Three-day workshop
 - Developers day
 - Community day
 - Tutorial day
 - Shared progress on secure app updates
- Establishing a foundation to steward Tock
- Tutorials & Documentation
 - book.tockos.org
- Open-source project
 - github.com/tock/tock

http://tockos.org



U:ckOS





Thank you! Questions?



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